Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 3

12-1-1926

Notes on Recent Cases
William L. Travis
Seymour Weisberger

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
William L. Travis & Seymour Weisberger, Notes on Recent Cases, 2 Notre Dame L. Rev. 99 (1927).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol2/iss3/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 3

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CORPORATIONS-The effect of corporate insolvency
upon rights as between creditors and a subscriber who makes a
conditional delivery of a stock subscription.--The trustee in
bankruptcy, representing creditors of an insolvent corporation,
brought an action against a subscriber to the capital stock. By way
of defense, the defendant alleged that he had signed the written
subscription to the capital stock but had delivered same to the
authorized agent of the corporation with the oral agreement that it
would not.become an dffective subscription unless, and until, he had
notified said company that it was to be binding upon him. In other
words it was not to be'a binding obligation until the subscriber was
ready to assume the liabilty. The defendant never notified the company that he would take the stock and pay for same so the condition
was never satisfied; but the corporation made an unauthorized entry
of his subscription on its books. The plaintiff replied that under these
facts the defendant was estopped to deny liability. No evidence
was offered to show that any credit was extended to the corporation
with knowledge of the subscription and reliance thereon. Held,
defendant not liable. Martin v. Steinke (Ct. App. Ohio 1926) 154
N. E. Adv. 47. '.h cases involving the conditional delivery of stock
subscription and avoidance of liability thereon, the subscriber is
entitled to be relieved from the obligation of said subscription unless
creditors or others dealing with said company knew of and relied
upon said stock subscription and were induced to extend credit to
said company or change their position in relation to said company,
to their injury, upon the strength of said subscription." Explaining
the difference between a conditional delivery of stock subscription
and a conditional subscripton, Pardee, P. J.; stated, "In the latter,
the corporation is to do something before the subscription becomes
obligatory, the subscription being a continuous offer by the subscriber
which becomes binding when accepted by the corporation by performance of the condition imposed. In the instant case, (conditional delivery), the subscriber reserved to himself the right to say
when the subscription should become binding upon him-or in other
words the company made him a- continuing offer to sell him its shares
of stock, which would become a binding obligation upon both when

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

and after he indicated his willingness to take and pay for the same."
Nowhere is there more confusion than in the law applicable to
conditional delivery of stock subscriptions. Not only are the courts
not in harmony in their application of law, but there is much confusion of the terms, "conditional subscription", and, "conditional
delivery of a subscripton". Moreover there are not many cases
reported involving a pure conditional delivery. However, a few
general observations will be noted.
Parol evidence is admissible to show that there was a conditional delivery and that the contract was inoperative. Clark, "Corporations," 3rd ed. p. 380, 381, Fletcher, "Corporations," Vol. 2.
sec. 600; Wilson v. Powers, 131 .Mass. 539. Contra: Madison and
Indianapolis Plankroad Co. v.Stevens, 10 InTd. 1; Wdght v. Shelby
RIR. Co. 16 B. Monroe (Ky.) 4, 63 Am. D. 522. A written subscription to stock may be delivered in escrow or conditionally and,
with certain exceptions, is not binding until the conditon is fulfilled.
This rule obtains where delivery is made to a third person, 14 C. J.
524; but where delivery is made to an agent or officer of the corporation some courts hold to the rule applicable to deeds which
makes the delivery absolute. Madison and Indianapolis Plankroad
Co. v. Stevens, supra; Wight v. Shelby RI?. Co., supra. The general
rule seems to be that the conditional delivery is good notwithstanding the fact that it was made to an officer or agent of the corporation, and, "Evidence is admissible to show, that the contract, absolute on its face, was not in fact so, and was not operative until the
happening of a contingency."
Clark, on Corporations 3rd ed.
p. 380, 3811; Accord: Cook, "Corporations," 8th ed. vol. 1, sec. 60:
Gilman v. Gross, 97 Wisc. 224; Gt. Western Tel. Co. v. Loewenthal,
154 IIl. 261, 40 N. E. 318. A subscriber may be estopped to set up
an oral agreement showing that there was a conditional delivery
and that the condition was never fulfilled if innocent creditors have
been induced to extend credit to the corporation, or have changed
their position relying on an apparent state of facts which did not
exist. 14 C. J. 524. Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Davis,
40 Minn. 110, 41 N. W. 1026, 12 Am. S. R. 701, 3 L. R. A. 796.
W. L. T.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Part Performance With
Compensation-Knowledge.--The granting of specific performance of an agreement, which has been only part performed,
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has been a weighty question for the consideration of courts
of equity.
The general rule in both England and the United
States, is to the effect that if one undertakes to convey real
estate free from incumbrances, the vendor must specifically
perform even though only part performance can be made.
Compensation must be made for the defect in performance.
That the vendee can get slecific performance with compensation
for what the seller could not give him, is generally recognized,
whether there is a deficiency in the quantity or quality -of the
res, or whether it is subject to an incumbrance, provided that
the buyer supposed at the time of the bargain that the seller
was in a position to give him all that he bargained for. Ames in
his case book (p. 251) enumerates in a very comprehensive note
cases for and against this general proposition. Some of the
cases supporting are as follows: Atty. Gen. v. Day, 1 Ves. Sr.
218, 224: Milligan v. Cook, 16 Ves. 1:17 Ill. 354: 144 Ill. 213:
7 Ind. 73: 144 N. Y. 671, 675 and a long list of cases from other
states.
This rule does not, however, go unchallenged in some
jurisdictions. Prominent among those cases opposed to giving
specific performance for part performance and compensation
are: Rieszs appeal, 73 Penn. 785: 60 Oregon 203, 118 Pac. 192,
Ann. Cas. 1914 A. 203, n.: and cases cited therein. The chief
objection to the principal rule is that of the danger of coercing
third parties to alieniate their rights away.
In the case under consideration, just decided by the
Supreme Court of Mass. in 152 N. E. report, pg. 243, the court
went one step further than previous courts in that and in
other states in dealing with this problem. In this case the
husband, selling property agreed to convey the estate imcluding the wife's dower rights therein, without having the
wife join in the agreement. The buyer had knowledge of the
wife's dower interest at the time of the purchase. The"husband
failed to secure the signature of the wife in the sale. Justice
Pierce took this case out of the general run by deciding that
even with the knowledge that the purchaser had concerning the
wife's interest in the land, the buyer could get specific performance
from the seller by means of partial performance and compensation.
No cases are given to support this part of the decision, but
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by dictum the court declares that the modern position of women
tends to reduce the danger of coercion. This case of Brookings
v. Cooper apparently is the most recent and strongest stand taken
by any court on this proposition.
S. W.

